The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Volume 27
Issue 4 December

Article 9

December 2000

Is Welfare Reform Working? A Study of the Effects of Sanctions
on Families Receiving Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
Taryn Lindhorst
Southern University, New Orleans

Ronald J. Mancoske
Southern University, New Orleans

Alice Abel Kemp
University of New Orleans

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw
Part of the Social Welfare Commons, and the Social Work Commons

Recommended Citation
Lindhorst, Taryn; Mancoske, Ronald J.; and Kemp, Alice Abel (2000) "Is Welfare Reform Working? A Study
of the Effects of Sanctions on Families Receiving Temporary Assistance to Needy Families," The Journal
of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 27 : Iss. 4 , Article 9.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol27/iss4/9

This Article is brought to you by the Western Michigan
University School of Social Work. For more information,
please contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.

Is Welfare Reform Working? A Study of the
Effects of Sanctions on Families Receiving
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
TARYN LINDHORST

Southern University at New Orleans
Welfare Reform Research Project
School of Social Work
RONALD J. MANCOSKE

Southern University at New Orleans
School of Social Work
ALICE ABEL KEMP

University of New Orleans
Department of Sociology

This research provides a preliminary descriptive analysis of the impact
of new welfare sanctions on recipients living in a southern metropolitan
region. The data from this phone survey indicate that many families report
considerablehardship no matter why they exited from welfare. Compared
to those who left voluntarily, those who were sanctioned off welfare were
significantly different in terms of having unmet medical needs, going
without food, and having their utilities turned off. Given the high number
of problems reported and the low income reported by these respondents,
it is not surprisingto find that only 10 percent of former recipients who
were sanctioned off of welfare feel that they are better off now than when
they received cash assistance. These problems can represent a significant
disruption in the lives of children and their parents.
The passage of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Act (PRWORA) was hailed as the "end of welfare
as we know it." Federal spending for AID to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was replaced with block grants given
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, December, 2000, Volume XXVII, Number 4
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to the states to create Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) programs. To "end welfare as we know it," the major
change from AFDC to TANF was the establishment of time limits
whereby a parent may only receive cash assistance for a period
of twenty-four consecutive months. Further, a lifetime limit of
five years, or sixty total months, was instituted. Other changes
enacted by the PRWORA include compulsory participation of
the adult recipient in work and job search activities, mandatory
provision of information for child support enforcement (i.e., the
father's name), and living arrangement and school attendance
requirements for teenaged parents. Sanctions for non-compliance
were increased so that benefits for the entire family could be
ended, not just benefits for the parent or child.
In the year following the passage of PRWORA, welfare rates
dropped 20 percent nationally, as reported by the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services (Children's Defense Fund,
1998). As of March, 1999, all states showed a reduction in the
number of recipients receiving benefits from the high period of
1993, with an overall average 48 percent reduction reported (U. S.
Department of Health and Human Services, 1999). Thirty-five
states had declines that were greater than the national average,
and of these, thirty-one had declines of 50 percent or more, and
nineteen states had declines of 60 percent or more. Table 1 shows
the number of recipients served and the percentage change for the
four states with the highest declines from January, 1993 through
March, 1999.
Table 1
Welfare CaseloadDeclines (1993-1999)
State

Pre-TANF
Jan. 1993

Post-TANF
March 1999

Percent
Change

Wyoming

18,271

1,770

-90%

Wisconsin

241,098

28,863

-88%

21,116

2,897

-86%

174,093

38,246

-78%

Idaho
Mississippi

Source: U. S. Department of Health and Human Services (1999)
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Throughout the country, the declining rolls are partly attributed to the robust economy (Children's Defense Fund, 1998).
Welfare administrators and politicians have claimed that these reductions are indicators that welfare recipients are obtaining work
and no longer relying on federal assistance. Nationally, however,
it is estimated that approximately 38 percent of those leaving
welfare were terminated because they failed to meet requirements
of the new law and were subjected to sanctions and involuntary
case closure (Not So Welfare, 1998).
In this complex environment, there is little data postPRWORA on exactly why families are leaving the welfare rolls,
and whether these exists happen voluntarily because of employment or other income gains, or forced through the increased
power of sanctioning. Further, what is happening to those families leaving welfare? What is their economic status after exiting welfare? Do they perceive themselves as better off? Are the
problems that sactioned recipients face different from those who
leave welfare voluntarily? This paper provides some preliminary
descriptive information from a small sample of families who left
welfare in the spring of 1998 in an urban area in the South.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The passage of the PRWORA highlights the tensions found
between two competing schools of thought regarding the cause
of poverty (Ellwood & Summers, 1986). Individual explanations
for poverty concentrate on the personal characteristics of the
population of people in poverty and propose causal relationships
between what are seen as individual deficits and poverty (Herrnstein & Murrary, 1994; Mead, 1992). Although unproven from
a scientific standpoint (Epstein, 1997), individual explanations
of poverty are embedded in PRWORA which, according to its
preamble, seeks to promote marriage and attachment to the work
force as the solutions to poverty (Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Act, 1996). Although individual explanations
for poverty dominate the PRWORA, a more structural focus is
also found in the law with regards to child care. Proponents
of a structural cause of poverty see inadequate access to high
quality, affordable child care as one of the impediments to a
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parent's ability to enter the work force (Institute for Women's
Policy Research, 1997). Other structural explanations for poverty,
including the gender stratification of women into low paying jobs
(Kemp, 1995; Sidel, 1992), the low level of the minimum wage
(Schram, 1997) and the effects of domestic violence on the need
for welfare (Brandwein, 1999) are not adequately addressed in
the law.
Research on exits from welfare prior to the enactment of
PRWORA suggested that those persons with the shortest history
of welfare use will be among those who exit quickly through
finding employment. One study found those women on welfare
most likely to obtain employment were those with high school
educations, previous work experience, family resources (such as
income from other family members), and no infants or toddlers
(Spalter-Roth, Burr, Hartman & Shaw, 1995). In a survey of nearly
3,000 Wisconsin AFDC families (prior to the TANF reforms), Rank
(1994) found approximately a third of the families exited welfare
because of increased income (primarily from employment), about
a third left because of sanctions applied, and the other third left
for other reasons. Many in this final third reported being less well
off than when on welfare, with some reporting crises because of
unmet medical needs or domestic violence.
Only a few studies are available that have examined the impact on families of the changes in welfare since the 1996 reforms,
although many are currently in process. Studies undertaken by
state agencies, advocacy organizations and policy groups have
used mail, phone and personal interviews or analysis of administrative data to determine the reasons recipients have left the
welfare rolls and their employment outcomes (Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, 1999). A summary of the
reasons for welfare exit in these studies shows wide discrepancy
in the number of people who report leaving welfare for a job, from
11.3% who were working (by administrative report) in the quarter
after their welfare exit in Maryland (University of Maryland,
1998) to 67% of respondents who reported to interviewers leaving
welfare for a job in Washington State (Washington Department
of Social and Human Services, 1999). Outcomes beyond a former
recipients' current employment status have not been summarized
across studies.
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The National Governor's Association (1998) reviewed reports
from eleven states in which state agencies evaluated the impact
of welfare reform. They found that between 50 to 60 percent of
those who left welfare did so because of employment. Employment, however, was not necessarily an exit from poverty As the
report noted, most jobs pay more than minimum wage, but still
leave workers with families below the official poverty line. Many
families reported continued hardship and deprivation once off
of welfare and most continued to need support through other
governmental programs such as Food Stamps or Medicaid.
The state of Maryland analyzed approximately 33,000 cases
that were closed-families or persons leaving welfare-during
the period October, 1996, through June,1997 (Life after Welfare: An
Interim Report, 1997). The five major reasons for exiting (in order
of frequency) were: receiving other income, not completing the
redetermination process, failing to provide requested verification,
starting employment, and failure to meet residency requirements.
Thirty- nine percent of these recipients were terminated involuntarily for reasons of non-compliance.
Welfare departments have been rewarded for insuring that
ineligible recipients are not provided financial assistance, but
no penalty has been attached to those instances when welfare
administrators have discontinued payments for still eligible families (Schram, 1996). "Churning" is the process of using noncompliance by recipients to deny payments while recipients are
still financially eligible (Lipsky, 1984). When recipients do not
produce requested paperwork, miss an appointment, or do not
follow a rule of the department, assistance can be terminated until
compliance occurs. In some cases, recipients report that they don't
know why their benefits were ended (Schram, 1996).
PRWORA expanded the capacity of departments to disallow
payments in a variety of circumstances, potentially increasing
the churning of recipients. The act incorporated many of the
experimental reforms established by states prior to 1996, including the use of a full family sanction as a deterrent designed to
induce compliance with institutional regulations. A full family
sanction allows the welfare agency to terminate benefits to an
entire family for non- compliance, whereas previously, benefits
for the non-compliant parent were withheld, but the children's
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portion of the AFDC grant continued to be paid (Ferber & Storch,
1998). Philosophically, sanctions can be seen as motivational tools
whose existence encourages welfare recipients to comply with
regulations, or they can be viewed as a punishment for failure to
comply with departmental rules (Kaplan, 1999). A recent review
of state sanction policies indicates that many states are opting
for more severe sanctioning (Gallagher & Gallagher, 1998), and
suspending payments to families that are financially eligible, but
who are unable or unwilling to comply with new departmental
regulations.
Although federal law does not require that states assess the
impact of sanctions on families, several governmental and advocacy organizations have begun efforts to do so. The Maryland
study notes that a relatively small number (4.7 percent) of persons whose cases were terminated were sanctioned for failure
to meet work requirements (Life After Welfare, 1997). A study in
Montana found that 22.7 percent of cases in the state were terminated because of non- compliance with (unspecified) departmental regulations (Coping with Block Grants, 1998). During the first
twenty-two months of the Montana TANF program, 36 percent
of the caseload was sanctioned at least once. A similar smaller
study conducted in Portland, Oregon, found that the majority
of welfare recipients exited because they found employment or
increased their income; however, 14 percent during the period
of the study were terminated for failure to meet work search
requirements (Multnomah County Department of Community
and Family Services, 1997). Comparison of sanction rates across
studies and states is impeded by disparities between reporting
practice. While some states report the percentage of cases closed
per month, others report the percentage of recipients sanctioned
in a given time period (Kaplan, 1999).
A national study looking at the use of sanctions was conducted by the General Accounting Office (GAO, 1997). By analyzing approximately 18,000 cases terminated nationwide, the
GAO found that from June to December, 1996, terminations for
failure to meet work requirements increased from 34 to 47 percent.
Other sanctionable offenses, such as non- compliance with child
support enforcement, and teen parent school attendance and living arrangements, remained level at approximately 8 percent of
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the terminations. Time limits accounted for less than one percent
of the terminations, but the study was conducted before recipients
would reach the first twenty-four month time period imposed by
the PRWORA.
About 72 percent of the GAO sample came from three states
with the highest case closure rates-Iowa, Massachusetts and
Wisconsin. Each state had experimented with the use of a full
family sanction. According to the GAO, one-third of terminated
families in Massachusetts and Wisconsin were reinstated because
of subsequent compliance, documentation of exemptions, or because the termination was due to an administrative error. Wisconsin, for example, reversed the termination of 44 percent of
their cases because their record-keeping on hours worked in
the previous month was in error. Iowa had a six-month waiting
period before families could reapply, and about one-third did so
and returned to AFDC rolls (GAO, 1997).
This review of recent literature related to reasons for exiting
welfare and the outcomes for those who do leave indicates wide
variation in the number of the people who actually leave welfare
involuntarily because of sanctions, and the number of former
recipients who are reported to be working after exiting welfare.
Evaluation of other outcomes for families who previously received welfare has been negligible.
METHODOLOGY
The results of this telephone survey provide a preliminary
descriptive analysis of the experiences of those persons living in
a southern metropolitan region who left the welfare rolls in the
spring of 1998. The study examines the demographic characteristics of these persons, their reasons for leaving the rolls, their
work-related characteristics, and some of their current problems.
This study was a one-time, cross-sectional telephone survey of
former welfare recipients whose names were obtained from the
state welfare department.
A survey instrument was designed by drawing on social science literature and by using similar surveys from recent research
evaluating outcomes for welfare recipients. The survey asked
former recipients about their reasons for leaving welfare, their
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current work and income status, and whether they were having
any of a list of several problems. The survey was piloted with
ten former welfare recipients and given to key informants in the
welfare arena who suggested modifications.
The research study was conducted over a one month period
with a list provided by the state department overseeing welfare
payments. The list consisted of the names and phone numbers of
1400 persons whose welfare benefits ended during a two month
period in the spring of 1998, prior to the implementation of time
limits on welfare benefits in the state. Of this list, 737 persons
could not be contacted by phone because the welfare department
had no phone number available, the phone had been disconnected, or the person was unknown at the number provided. Of
the 663 persons available by phone, completed interviews were
obtained from 347, for a response rate of 52%. Analysis of reasons
for non-response by the remaining 316 subjects showed that 21
percent were unavailable because they were out of town, in the
hospital or incarcerated. Another 19 percent were at supposedly
valid phone numbers where no one answered calls that were
placed at three different times during different days and times
of the week. A small number of people refused to participate in
the survey once they were reached (8%).
While the 347 responses obtained represent all known, reachable participants who were willing to participate in the survey, the
sample is not a random sample. Therefore, generalizations to the
population of interest are questionable because it is impossible
to determine the characteristics of the unreachable portion of the
population. Logically, however, one could assume that the population reached represents the most stable of the former welfare recipients, as they were reachable at a number they had previously
given the department. All data collected from the interviews with
former recipients were self-reported. No other outside sources
were used to verify the validity of the data. The usual concerns
about the validity of self-reported responses applies to this study.
FINDINGS
Demographic information on respondents to the survey
showed that 91 percent were African-American, 8 percent were
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white, and the other 1 percent were other races. All respondents
were female, and the average age was 32 years. Ninety-four percent (94%) of the respondents were self-recipients or the identified
parent or guardian payee for a child. According to information
provided by the department about the typical characteristics of
the TANF population, this sample is similar to the overall state
statistics which report that 85% of TANF recipients are non-white
with an average age of 33 years.
Table 2 reports the recipients' reasons for leaving welfare,
which have been separated into two broad categories: voluntary
Table 2
Frequencies and Percentages for Respondents' Primary Reason
(Voluntary and Involuntary)for Discontinuing Welfare Payments
PrimaryReason-Voluntary
Employed
Received Other Income
Other Voluntary Reasons
Too Much Hassle
Could Not Do Preferred School Program
Married and Spouse's Income Counted
Voluntary Sub-Total

Percent
(n = 347)

21.0
14.9
10.8
9.0
3.2
1.7
60.6%

PrimaryReason-Involuntary

Percent

Did Not Comply with DSS Rules
Did Not Meet Work Search Requirements
Recipient Didn't Know Why Terminated
Rules Changed-No Longer Eligible
Recipient No Longer Guardian of Child*
Child Not Meeting School Attendance Requirements
Did Not Meet Immunization Requirements
In Voluntary Sub-Total
Total
*Child aged out or was removed from parent's custody

10.8
7.9
7.6
7.0
4.4
2.3
0.3
40.3%
100.0%
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leavers (generally, those who have left welfare because they have
received some other form of income), and sanctioned leavers
(those whose welfare payments were discontinued because the
recipient did not meet certain guidelines). Table 2 shows that the
most frequent reason for leaving welfare was that the recipient
obtained employment (21%). The second most common reason
for exiting was the receipt of other income (almost 15%). This
category includes income from child support, unemployment insurance, Social Security and SSI (Supplemental Security Income).
Altogether, 60 percent of the respondents stopped receiving welfare payments for what might be considered voluntary reasons,
while 40 percent were terminated for largely involuntary reasons.
Most categories of the involuntary reasons reflect new sanctions
implemented under the PRWORA.
Table 3 compares all respondents by the voluntary/sanctioned leaver dichotomy. Mean differences in age, years of education, level of reported income, and the number of problems

Table 3
Descriptive Statistics and T-Test Results ComparingSanctioned and
Not sanctionedRespondents or Age, Years of Schooling, Total Monthly
Income and Number of Problems
Variable
Age of Respondent
Sanctioned
Not Sanctioned
Years of Schooling
Sanctioned
Not Sanctioned
Total Monthly Income
Sanctioned
Not Sanctioned
Total Number of Problems
Sanctioned
Not Sanctioned
*Difference significant at p < .05.

Frequency

Mean

Std. Dev.

137
203

33.82
31.25

12.38
9.57

137
199

11.50
11.84

2.36
2.34

131
192

304.22
691.58

421.19
711.14

135
195

2.74
1.98

3.06
2.43

t
-2.155*

1.317

5.599*

-2.480*
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recipients reported were evaluated. A list of problems such as
having difficulty paying bills, having to move, and going without
food were presented to respondents who were asked if they had
experienced the problem in the previous three months. Any "yes"
answer was coded as "1" and then each problem noted by a
respondent was summed to create a total. Thirty-two percent of all
respondents indicated that they had none of the problems listed;
44.6 percent reported having from one to three problems, and 23.7
percent noted having more than three problems. Table 3 indicates
that survey respondents who left welfare voluntarily were more
likely to be younger, but they were not significantly different from
those who were sanctioned in level of education. As might be
anticipated, those who were sanctioned had significantly lower
incomes and reported more problems than their counterparts who
left welfare voluntarily.
Table 4 lists the specific problems asked of respondents, the
percent of the sample that reported that problem, and the means
for the voluntary vs. sanctioned leavers for each problem. Respondents who had been sanctioned reported a greater number
of problems, and had higher means levels for all problems, except
"had others move in to help pay rent". For four problem areas,
sanctioned respondents had significantly higher mean differences
as noted through the use of a t test: they were more likely to
have been unable to afford needed medications and/or health
care (t = -3.317), to have gone without food (t = -2.486),
and to have other problems (t = -3.304) to have their heat or
utilities cut off (t = -2.525) than were former recipients who had
left welfare voluntarily. The mean number of problems for those
who were sanctioned and those who left welfare voluntarily were
not statistically different within the following categories: having
to change their living arrangements, being unable to pay rent,
having the phone disconnected, having to go to a food bank or
soup kitchen, having their children change schools, having a child
live away from the caregiver, being homeless, and having a child
spend time in foster care.
Table 5 shows the results of two chi square tests of the relationship between leaving status (voluntary leavers vs. sanctioned)
and 1) work status and 2) whether respondents saw themselves as
being better off now than when they received welfare payments.
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Table 4
Problems Encountered in Past 3 Months Since Recipient Stopped
Receiving Welfare Payments
Percent
of sample
Responding
"YES"

Sanctioned

Couldn't Afford Medical Care
or Medications

39.3%

.50*

Went without Food

27.4%

Unable to Pay Rent

22.8%

Phone Disconnected

21.7%

Hand to Move in with Others

20.5%

Went to Food Bank or Soup
Kitchen

17.6%

Heat or Utilities Disconnected

15.4%

Family Had Other Problems

14.7%

Had to Move because Recipient
Couldn't Pay Rent

12.5%

Child(ren) had to Change
Schools because Recipient
Moved

11.6%

Had Others Move in to Help
Pay Rent

8.1%

Child(ren) had to Live away
from Caregiver

6.7%

Were Homeless during the Past
3 Months

4.1%

Child(ren) Spent Time in Foster
Care

1.2%

Problem
(n = 345)

T test significant at p < .05

Mean
Not
Sanctioned
.33
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Those recipients who left welfare voluntarily were more likely to
be working (28 percent of respondents) than were those who had
been sanctioned (6 percent of respondents) (X 2 = 40.766, df = 1,
p < .001). (Thirty-four percent of those in the study were actually
working at the time the survey was completed). The lambda test
is a Proportion of Variance Explained (PVE) test used to calculate
the amount of variance explained by a chi square finding. For
the chi square of leaving status by work status, the lambda is
.04, indicating that a respondent's leaving status explained only
about 4% of the variance in their work status. Respondents were
asked whether they felt like they and their children were better
off now than when they were receiving welfare. Overall, only
46 percent of the total sample stated that they and their children were better off now than when they were receiving welfare payments. Table 5 shows that those who were sanctioned
off of welfare were less likely to feel that they were better off
(X 2 = 32.281, df = 1, p < .001). The lambda statistic for this
chi square is .22, indicating that 22% of the variance in a respondent's report of whether they were better off was related to their
leaver status.
DISCUSSION
The passage of the PRWORA has ushered in a new era in
which the increased ability of the state to end all cash assistance
benefits to non-compliant, but otherwise financially eligible families, has become a significant tool used to enforce compliance
with departmental regulations. Although many popular press
accounts attribute the decrease in welfare rolls to the increased
Table 5
Chi Square Results of Leaver Status by Work Status and Report of
Being Better Off Now
2

Variable

df

Work Status by Leaver Status

1

40.77

<.001

Better Off Now by Leaver Status

1

32.28

<.001

x

p value
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employment of impoverished parents (DeParle, 1998), the descriptive data provided by this survey indicate that these accounts
may be based on inadequate research. A minority of the respondents in this survey (21 percent) actually left welfare because
they had obtained employment. At the time of the survey, only
about one third of the respondents were working, regardless of
their reason for leaving welfare. Respondents who voluntarily left
welfare reported an average yearly income of $8,299-an amount
that is 63% of the poverty threshold of $13,133 for a parent with
two children set by the U. S. Census Bureau for this time period
(U. S. Census Bureau, 1998). For families that had been sanctioned
off of welfare, their average yearly income was significantly lower
-$3,651, an amount which is 28% of the poverty level. Based
on previous research documenting unreported income among
welfare recipients (Edin, 1991), these figures must be viewed
somewhat skeptically, but still indicate that leaving welfare is no
guarantee that a family will escape poverty, regardless of the reason for leaving welfare. These findings also indicate that the use
of sanctions as a motivation to increase workforce participation is
ineffective. Contrary to the expectation of politicians, sanctioned
families are not entering the workforce (only 6% were working
after having their welfare payments terminated), but instead are
slipping even deeper into poverty.
Prior to the passage of the PRWORA, sanctions could only be
applied against a portion of the household, usually the parent,
leaving some benefits available for the care of children. With the
full family sanction made possible by the PRWORA, attention
is needed to the effects of these new policies on impoverished
parents and children. The data from this survey indicate that
many families report considerable hardship no matter why they
exited from welfare. Sanctioned families report an increase in the
overall number of problems they are experiencing and an increase
in the average number of problems in certain areas. Compared to
those who left voluntarily, those who were sanctioned off welfare
were significantly different in terms of having unmet medical
needs, going without food, and having their utilities turned off.
Each of these problems can represent a significant disruption
in the lives of children and their parents. If the goal of the full
family sanction is to increase the compliance of the adult payee
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with welfare department regulations, then it is not clear from this
study that this goal is being met. Given the higher number of
problems reported and the decrease in income reported by these
respondents, it is not surprising to find that only 10 percent of
former recipients who were sanctioned off of welfare feel that
they are better off now than when they received cash assistance.
Sanctioning families for non-compliance may be viewed as a
punishment for misbehavior, but is this punishment encouraging
changed behavior or is it ensuring that poor children (the primary
recipients of TANF dollars) are placed in even greater jeopardy?
This descriptive study provides information about problems
that families report after leaving welfare. Further research is
needed to ascertain the long-term effects of sanctions on families experiencing poverty. Research is needed to determine the
characteristics of those who are most likely to be sanctioned.
If sanctions are applied more readily to those people who face
the greatest barriers to employment (those with mental illness,
substance abuse problems, domestic violence), as some advocates
fear (Coping with Block Grants, 1998), then sanctions may actually be ineffective in accomplishing the policy goals they have
been designed to support. Sanctions may reduce the welfare rolls,
but without reducing poverty and its concomitant difficulties, this
represents a hollow victory.
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